CMS has had a continuing interest in
intrODUCtiOn Several analyses have shown that diag nosisbased risk adjusters do not fully pre dict the expenditures of the frail elderly, where frailty is generally defined in terms of functional impairments (Pope et al., 1998 (Pope et al., , 2000 Pope, 2001, 2004; Kautter et al., 2007) . Diagnosisbased mod els do predict the expenditures of the frail elderly substantially better than demo graphic models, but some residual expendi tures statistically associated with functional impairment remain unexplained. CMS has thus had a continuing interest in exploring ways to incorporate frailty adjustment into the CMSHCC risk adjustment method ology for Medicare Advantage and other Medicare private organizations (Pope et al., 2004) . The goal of frailty adjustment is to account for the costs not explained by diagnosisbased risk adjustment.
Predicting expenditures accurately for subgroups of Medicare beneficiaries is de sirable. Accurate prediction for the frail elderly is especially significant because they do not comprise a uniform proportion of the enrollment of all Medicare capitated organizations, and their expenditures are considerably higher than the average ben eficiary. This is a particularly important issue for organizations whose models of care focus disproportionately on the frail elderly, for example PACE organizations. 1 A payment factor to account for potentially higher expenditures for the frail elderly is important in ensuring the viability of these organizations, and access for beneficiaries to the care they provide. Therefore, since 2004, CMS has applied a frailty adjustment to payments for enrollees in PACE orga nizations (Kautter and Pope, 20042005) . 2 CMS adopted the approach taken by many researchers and clinicians of defining frailty as functional impairment, and using counts of difficulty in performing activities of daily living (ADLs) as the core measure of functional impairment. The original frailty adjuster model was estimated using ADL information in the Medicare Current Bene ficiary Survey (MCBS). The frailty adjuster is prospective, meaning that Medicare expenditures in a given year are predicted by ADL information in the prior year. Services, 2007a,b; 2008) . 3 We present research results for Medicare risk adjustment of the frail elderly since the adoption of frailty adjustment for PACE organizations in 2004 (Kautter, Ingber, and Pope, 2007) . In particular, we describe the development of a frailty adjuster estimat ed on the Medicare FeeForService Consum er Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS ® ) Survey. Medicare is transitioning PACE organization pay ments to 100 percent of the revised frail ty adjuster over the 5year period 20082012.
Original FrailtY aDJUSter
The original frailty adjuster was cali brated using 1994 to 1997 data from the MCBS for the communityresiding, age 55 or over population enrolled in feeforser vice (FFS) Medicare (Kautter and Pope, 2004) . The MCBS is a nationally representa tive sample of Medicare beneficiaries. 4 We found that frailty factors are quite different for communityresiding versus longterm institutionalized (nursing home) beneficia ries, and concluded that the appropriate frailty adjuster for the longterm institution alized should be a factor of zero. 5 At the time the initial frailty model was created, the MCBS data was the only comprehensive data available that allowed linkage of individuallevel functional impair ment data (ADLs) to Medicare claims data.
Information from the MCBS was used to predict expenditures related to frailty that were unexplained by the CMSHCC risk adjustment model. The ADLs may not relate to the incremental expenditures caus ally, but are strongly correlated with addi tional expenditures. Actual frailty scores for health organizations are calculated at the contract level (rather than the plan benefit package level) 6 using these frailty factors and an estimate of the ADL limitations of enrollees reported in the Health Outcomes Survey (HOS) sent to a sample of enrollees in each organization. These frailty scores are added to the risk adjustment factors in payment. The original frailty factors cali brated on the 19941997 MCBS were 1.094, 0.340, 0.172, and -0.143 respectively, for, counts of ADL difficulty 56, 34, 12, and 0 (Kautter and Pope, 2004) .
UPDate anD reFineMent OF FrailtY aDJUSter
The source of data used to calibrate the frailty factors was changed so that the methods used to gather ADLrelated data for both calibration and payment would be similar, avoiding measurement dispari ties that come from using different data collection methods. As previously noted, the original frailty factors were calibrated using ADL limitation information gathered from MCBS inperson surveys. CAHPS ® data, which were used to update and refine the frailty factors, and HOS data, which are used to calculate frailty scores for payment, both collect ADL information via mail surveys with telephone followup.
CaHPS ® FrailtY aDJUStMent PrOSPeCtive MODeling SaMPle
The CAHPS ® survey is a selfadminis tered mail survey with telephone followup (RTI International, 2005 
analYtiC variaBleS
In this section we describe the creation of key analytic variables used to develop the CAHPS ® frailty adjuster, including residual Medicare expenditures based on the CMS HCC risk adjustment model, ADLs, and model weights.
residual Medicare expenditures
These expenditures are defined as:
Residual Expenditures = Actual Expendi tures -CMSHCC Predicted Expenditures.
We now describe the creation of actual and predicted expenditures, the two com ponents of residual expenditures, and then provide descriptive statistics on residual expenditures. Payment year actual Medi care expenditures for each beneficiary are calculated. The methodology is as follows. First, Medicare Parts A and B expendi tures (excluding hospice expenditures) are summed for each eligible month in the payment year, where eligible months are defined as communityresiding, FFS, aged/ disabled, nonhospice months in the pay ment year. Second, total expenditures are annualized by dividing them by the fraction of the payment year the beneficiary had eli gible months. For example, if a person has 6 eligible months in the payment year, and generates $25,000 in total expenditures, then the annualized total expenditure for the beneficiary is $50,000.
We use the CMSHCC community risk adjustment model to create payment year predicted expenditures (Pope et al., 2004 Table 2 . The CMSHCC model predicts expenditures accurately for this population as a whole, which is why mean residual expenditures equal $0. However, onehalf of the sample has residual expen ditures less than $2,448, and onehalf have greater residual expenditures. 10 Given it is well known that medical expenditure distributions tend to have high cost out liers, it is not surprising that our residual expenditure distribution is skewed. What these data show is that roughly 25 per cent of the sample is underpredicted by the CMSHCC model, and 75 percent is overpredicted. An interesting breakdown differentiates by ADL group, as shown in Figure 1 . The percentage of each group that is underpredicted by the model is broadly similar, however, the magnitudes of under prediction are clearly greater for the high ADL groups.
activities of Daily living
CAHPS ® asks: "Because of a health or physical problem, do you have any diffi culty doing the following activities?" The activities are: bathing, dressing, eating, get ting in or out of chairs, walking, and using the toilet. We create a count scale based on the number of ADL difficulties, i.e., 56, 34, 12, and no difficulties (for beneficiaries responding "doesn't do the ADL," we impute "difficulty"). Because the frailty adjuster is prospective, we use counts of ADL difficulties in the base year.
Model weights
We start with the CAHPS ® survey weights and adjust these weights to ac count for the fact that we are using a sub set of the CAHPS ® respondent sample in our frailty adjustment modeling. The pro cedure used to adjust the CAHPS ® survey weights was to use control totals in a pro cess called poststratification. The primary objective of poststratification is to dampen potential biases arising from a combination of response errors, sampling frame under coverage, and nonresponse. Finally, we adjusted the CAHPS ® poststratified weights by multiplying them by the fraction of the payment year with eligible months. These were the final weights used in the frailty adjustment model. did experience differential effects. Larger reductions were found for those beneficia ries more prone to have chronic conditions and those with high home health use pre BBA (McCall et al., 2003) , characteristics typical of the functionally impaired. To illustrate, Figure 2 tracks Medicare FFS per capita home health expenditures by ADL group between 1994 and 2002. As is evident in the figure, there is a signifi cant drop in home health expenditures for the high ADL group during the late 1990s. Given the frailty adjustment model predicts residual expenditures (actual expenditures minus CMSHCC predicted expenditures), to the extent that high ADL beneficiaries' actual expenditures were decreased by the change in the home health payment sys tem, this would have lowered their residual expenditures, and hence their frailty factor.
DeSCriPtive analYSiS FOr CaHPS ® analYtiC SaMPle
We also refined the frailty adjustment model to compute two sets of frailty fac tors: (1) for those Medicare beneficiaries who are dually eligible for Medicaid, and (2) for those who are not (Table 5) . Each of the regression coefficients is statisti cally significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level, except for Medicaid ADL 12, which is insignificant. The equal ity of regression coefficient estimates for Medicaid and nonMedicaid is rejected at the 1 percent level of significance. The frailty factor for Medicaid beneficiaries with 56 ADLs is only approximately one half that for nonMedicaid beneficiaries with 56 ADLs (0.188 versus 0.377). On the other side of the spectrum, the frailty factor for Medicaid beneficiaries with no functional impairments is approximately two times (in absolute value) that for non Medicaid beneficiaries with no functional impairments (0.183 versus 0.089).
Frailty factors steadily rise with counts of ADLs, both for Medicaid (0.183 to 0.024 to 0.132 to 0.188) and for nonMedicaid (0.089 to 0.110 to 0.200 to 0.377), which was not the case for the original MCBS frailty adjuster (Kautter and Pope, 2004) . One explanation for this is the much larger sample size of the CAHPS ® compared with the MCBS, which other things equal, will produce more stable frailty factors.
One reason for the difference in the magnitude of the coefficients for Medicaid and nonMedicaid beneficiaries is that the CMSHCC risk adjuster model incorpo rates an adjustment for Medicaid status. Thus CMSHCC model predictions are higher for Medicaid beneficiaries than otherwise similar nonMedicaid beneficia ries. The residuals left to be explained by frailty adjustment are reduced on average. 
DiSCUSSiOn
In this article we presented our con tinuing frailty adjustment research and development since the adoption of frailty adjustment for PACE organizations in 2004. We described the development of a frailty adjustment model calibrated on CAHPS ® . CMS (2007a CMS ( ,b: 2008 is transitioning PACE organization payments to 100 percent of the revised frailty factors over the 5year period 20082012.
Although CMS (2007a,b; 2008) is con tinuing to apply frailty adjustment to PACE payments, the following methodological concerns have led CMS to conclude that the application of frailty adjustment pro gramwide in 2008 would not improve pay ment accuracy. First, HOS survey data currently used to determine frailty scores for payment is sampled only at the contract level and, therefore, does not allow CMS to calculate accurate frailty scores at the plan benefit package level. Because bids and plan benefit designs are determined for the plan benefit package level, applying a con tractlevel frailty score would lead to incon sistent payments across organizations and beneficiaries. Second, if frailty were applied programwide, Medicare Advantage organi zations would need to project a frailty score in their plan bids. However, when CMS pays organizations, they use frailty scores calculated after the bid has been submitted. Due to the changing nature of the market place and the different enrollment profiles of plans from year to year, this creates a risk that the level of frailty assumed by a plan in its bid would not reflect its actual frailty score in the payment year. PACE plans do not bid on Part C benefits, and would not be affected by this issue.
CMS nevertheless has a continuing in terest in exploring ways to incorporate frailty adjustment into the CMSHCC risk adjustment methodology for Medicare Advantage organizations. CMS will continue to explore ways to incorporate factors into the CMSHCC risk adjustment model that will predict costs associated with the frailty of individual beneficiaries. Making frailty adjusted payments regardless of Medicare Advantage organization type would encour age all organizations to enroll frail benefi ciaries, to innovate in their care (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 1999) , and to care for them in the community rather than in longterm care institutions. There are however several concerns regarding expanding the application of frailty adjust ment besides the operational factors pre viously mentioned. Among the issues that will need to be addressed before frailty adjustment can be expanded are (1) size of calibration sample and stability of frailty factors, (2) possible need for restandard ization of the Medicare capitation payment county ratebook for frailty, and (3) inherent limitations in surveybased approaches to frailty adjustment (e.g., nonresponse bias), and whether nonsurveybased approaches are preferred.
